Houthis Back on the Attack

The BRS Weekly Tanker Newsletter dated 14 July 2025 was cited in TradeWinds and Lloyd’s List, discussing Red Sea transit since recent Houthi attacks: https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/greeks-keep-plying-bab-el-mandeb-strait-despite-houthi-attacks-and-reshuffled-trade-flows/2-1-1846231

And the role of Greek players in the Russian export trade is clearly showing in Bab el Mandeb transit data, given that Aframaxes loading Urals for voyages to China and India take this route, not the longer Cape of Good Hope route. Greek owners have accounted for 23% of Bab el Mandeb transits year to date, according to brokerage BRS, topping transits by owners from the UAE (18%), Russia (8%) and China (8%). https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154229/Threats-to-Russian-oil-flows-intensify-but-exports-keep-chugging-along

Two attacks in two days. On 6 July, the 35,812 Dwt bulker Magic Seas was struck by drone boats, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire 51 miles off the Yemeni port of Hudaydah. The Houthis claimed responsibility for this attack and released footage of the vessel appearing to sink in the Red Sea. In retaliation, Israel attacked several Houthi targets in Yemen for the first time in over a month…

Greek owners remain the top BeM transiters. Transits by Greek-owned tankers have made up 23% of voyages through the BeM so far this year, followed by the UAE (18%), Russia (8%), and China (8%) which dispels the notion that only grey fleet tankers are willing to transit the region. This order is essentially unchanged from the same period in 2023, although then China was slightly ahead of Russia.

Grey fleet and mainstream tankers transit roughly equally. So far this year, 48% of transits have been on mainstream tankers, while 40% have been on sanctioned grey fleet tankers, and 12% have been on non-sanctioned grey fleet tankers. The proportion of grey fleet tankers transiting the Red Sea has increased from 1Q25, when mainstream tankers dominated. This suggests that some of the tankers frequently transiting BeM have been more recently sanctioned. Naturally, the proportion of transits that are made by grey fleet members have also increased significantly since 2023, when the grey fleet was much smaller. The grey fleet now makes up over 10% of the global tanker fleet, and around 75% of the grey fleet is now directly or indirectly sanctioned, drawing these numbers higher. Indeed, data suggest that the grey fleet continues to increase as some purchasers of Russian or Iranian oil appear unwilling to transport their cargo on sanctioned tonnage but remain willing to accept ‘grey’ tonnage. Furthermore, due to the nature of the trade in Russian oil, it is difficult to determine precisely where these ‘grey’ tankers are loading and discharging. However, we tentatively suggest that the lion’s share of these crude transits discharge in either China or India.